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Introduction
Concerns over agency costs dominate corporate law.1 The central
challenge is ensuring that directors act in the corporation's best interests,
rather than their own best interests. 2 Shareholder litigation is a key tool in

* Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. B.A., Amherst College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School.
1. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A.
Stout, Team Productionin Business Organizations:An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 743
(1999) ("It is difficult to overstate the influence that the principal-agent approach has had on
modem thinking about business organizations.").
2. See Steven M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers,
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 785-86 (2006) (noting that "agency costs are the inevitable
consequence of vesting discretion in someone other than the residual claimant" and that "[a]
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controlling these agency costs.3 If directors cross the line, the law provides
an array of litigation options that shareholders can use to hold directors
accountable. Shareholders can file securities class actions if directors lie to
them.4 They can file shareholder derivative suits if directors engage in
egregious misconduct.5 And they can file lawsuits under both state and
federal law if directors try to sell the company at too low of a price or
without adequate disclosures.
Shareholder litigation, however, has agency costs of its own. 7 Most

shareholder plaintiffs lack sufficient incentives to closely monitor these
lawsuits.8 As a result, plaintiffs' attorneys can make litigation decisions that
benefit themselves at the expense of their shareholder clients. 9 This concern
arises in nearly all types of shareholder litigation-from shareholder
derivative suits to securities class actions and merger cases. 10 Regardless of

complete theory of the firm therefore requires one to balance the virtues of discretion against
the need to require that discretion be used responsibly").
3. See Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REv. 105, 118 (2006) ("In theory,
directors are accountable to shareholders through derivative lawsuits, shareholder voting,
and the invisible hand of the market.").
4. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975).
5. See Agostino v. Hicks, 845 A.2d 1110, 1116 (Del. Ch. 2006) ("Recognizing,
however, that directors and officers of a corporation may not hold themselves accountable to
the corporation for their own wrongdoing, courts of equity have created an ingenious device
to police the activities of corporate fiduciaries: the shareholder's derivative suit.").
6. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016) (discussing
the legal landscape of merger class actions).
7. See, e.g., David H. Webber, Private Policing of Mergers and Acquisitions: An
Empirical Assessment of InstitutionalLead Plaintiffs in TransactionalClass and Derivative
Suits, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 907, 923 (2014) ("But litigation to enforce these rights generates
costs of its own, including agency costs created by the disconnect between the interests of
plaintiffs' lawyers and those of the shareholder class they represent.").
8. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in
Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for
Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1991) (attributing high agency costs in class action and
derivative litigation primarily to the inability of the class to effectively monitor the
attorneys); Alon Klement, Who Should Guard the Guardians? A New Approach for
Monitoring Class Action Lawyers, 21 REv. LITIG. 25, 45 (2002) ("Common to all agency
problems is their correlation with the asymmetry of information between the principal and
the agent. The less the principal is informed, the higher the agency costs will be.").
9. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understandingthe PlaintiffsAttorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REv. 669 (1986).
10. See infra Part II.
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the underlying law, shareholder litigation faces a common need for a
gatekeeper.
Yet, despite this shared problem, different types of shareholder litigation
use very different gatekeepers to solve it. In securities class actions,
Congress put its trust in institutional investors, hoping that their significant
financial stake in these lawsuits would lead them to exercise greater control
over their attorneys." In derivative suits, the law places its faith in
corporate boards, who can use special procedural devices to take control of
suits filed in the corporation's name. 12 And in merger cases, the law relies
on greater oversight by judges in their review of settlements coupled with
greater power for corporations to screen these lawsuits ex ante in their
bylaws and charters.13
There are good reasons for these differences. In securities class actions,
the plaintiffs are often large institutions, which are uniquely suited to
monitor these claims. 14 Derivative suits are filed on behalf of corporations,
not shareholders, 1 5 so it makes sense to give corporate boards a voice in
how these cases are litigated. And when it comes to merger cases, Delaware
judges are motivated to exercise special oversight over these cases because
they can threaten Delaware's dominance over state corporate law. 16
Different gatekeepers, in other words, make sense.
None of the gatekeepers in these areas, however, have solved all of the
problems in shareholder litigation. Institutional investors have cut down on
some of the abuses in securities class actions, but created others.1 7
Corporate boards are often motivated to protect their own interests in
derivative suits, rather than the interests of plaintiff corporations." And
Delaware judges have been unable to stop merger cases from fleeing to
other jurisdictions to escape their scrutiny.1 9 By viewing each type of

11. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I) (2012).
12. See infra Section II.C.
13. See infra Section II.B.
14.

See LAARNI T. BULAN ET AL., CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION

SETTLEMENTS: 2015 REVIEW AND ANALYSIS 16 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publi
cations/Reports/Securities-Class-Action-Settlements-2015-Review-and-Analysis (noting that
a majority of securities class actions are filed today are filed by institutional investors).
15. See La. Mun. Police Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Pyott, 46 A.3d 313, 330 (Del. Ch. 2012)
(holding that it is a "legal truism that the underlying claim in a derivative action belongs to
the corporation").
16. See infra Section II.B.
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. See infra Section II.C.
19. See infra Section II.B.
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shareholder litigation as its own discrete problem, the legal system has
missed an opportunity to learn broader lessons about the role of gatekeepers
in shareholder litigation.
This Article examines gatekeepers through a wider lens. Given that no
single gatekeeper is perfect, the legal system should look for ways to use a
greater mix of gatekeepers in shareholder litigation. First, judges should
take the enhanced scrutiny used in merger cases and apply it in derivative
suits and securities class actions-areas where settlements have
traditionally received only cursory review from judges. Second, corporate
boards should have a greater role in shaping procedural rules through bylaw
and charter provisions, subject to judicial and market scrutiny to ensure that
boards are not misusing this power. Finally, legislatures should adopt
heightened procedures, where appropriate, to better identify meritorious
cases at an early stage of the proceedings.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines the common need
for gatekeepers in shareholder litigation. Part II describes the different types
of gatekeepers used in different types of shareholder lawsuits. Part III takes
a broader view of gatekeeping in shareholder litigation, exploring how
gatekeeping lessons can be applied across different types of lawsuits. In the
end, as we will see, gatekeeping is too important to be left to any single
group.
L The Need for Gatekeepers in ShareholderLitigation
Shareholder litigation is designed to combat one type of agency costs,
but, in the process, it has created an entirely different type. While corporate
law is primarily concerned with mitigating the agency costs between
shareholders and corporate managers, 20 debates about shareholder litigation
revolve around how best to mitigate the agency costs between shareholders
and their attorneys. 21 This Part I explains those agency costs generally and
then discusses how they play out in different types of shareholder lawsuits.

20. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 1, at 86-88 (describing the agency costs that result
from a separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation); Edward B. Rock,
Adapting to the New Shareholder-CentricReality, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 1907, 1911 (2013)
("The separation of ownership and control has been the master problem of U.S. corporate
law since the days of Berle and Means, if not before.").
21. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining
Managers in a World with Weak Shareholder Litigation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 19, 22 (2016)
("[T]he benefits created by [shareholder litigation] are qualified by the litigation agency
costs that surround them.").
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Agency costs exist in all types of lawsuits. Whether the case is a
multimillion-dollar securities class action or a run-of-the-mill negligence
case, there is always a concern that a lawyer will act in his or her own best
22
interests rather than in the interests of the client. In most cases, however,
these agency costs are controlled in two ways. First, a client can monitor his
or her attorney's decisions, questioning those that do not appear to be in the
client's best interests and ultimately firing the attorney if the client's wishes
are not followed.23 Second, in contingency cases, the attorney's interests are
typically aligned with the client's interests. 24 If, for example, the victim of
an auto accident agrees to pay her attorney thirty percent of the recovery,
both the victim and her attorney benefit from a higher recovery. Their
interests are aligned, reducing the agency costs in the suit.
Shareholder lawsuits are different. Most shareholder lawsuits are
representative suits, which means that a shareholder plaintiff represents the
real parties in interest in the suits.25 In securities and merger class actions,
26
the real party in interest is a much larger class of shareholders, while in
derivative suits, it is the corporation that was allegedly injured by the
misconduct of its directors or officers.27 The representative nature of these
suits means that the real parties in interest are not directly involved in the
litigation and are therefore limited in their ability to monitor or control their
attorneys.
21
In theory, the representative shareholder will monitor these lawsuits. In
practice, however, this monitoring function is limited because most
representative shareholders lack the necessary incentives to monitor the
suit. 29 There is no minimum ownership requirement to file a shareholder

22. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 3, 8.
23. See id. at 8-9.
24. See id. at 17-18.
25. See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder
Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REv. 1, 6 (2015) ("[M]ost
shareholder litigation is representative litigation, brought by a single shareholder or group of
shareholders on behalf of an interest common to all.").
26. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw § 15.1 (1986).
27. See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) ("In [a derivative
suit] the shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation .... [A]ny damages recovered ... are
paid to the corporation." (quoting CLARK, supra note 26, at 639-40)); Jessica Erickson,
CorporateMisconduct and the Perfect Storm of ShareholderLitigation, 84 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 75, 81 (2008).
28. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
ShareholderLitigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5, 49.
29. See id.
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lawsuit, so a shareholder representative could theoretically own as little as
one share of stock in the relevant company.30 And, although many
shareholder plaintiffs own more than one share, they may still not own a
large enough stake to justify the costs of closely monitoring the litigation.3
In other words, the shareholder plaintiff incurs all of the costs of monitoring
the attorney, but receives only a fraction of the benefits.
These mismatched incentives increase the agency costs in shareholder
lawsuits in two related ways. First, they create an incentive for attorneys to
file lawsuits that may not be in their clients' best interests.2 In typical
negligence lawsuits, clients will only seek an attorney and authorize a
lawsuit if they believe that the suit would be in their best interests.33 In
contrast, in shareholder lawsuits, the real parties in interest (i.e., the entire
class of shareholders in a class action or the plaintiff corporation in a
derivative suit) do not decide whether to file the suit. Instead, this decision
is made by representative shareholders and their attorneys.34 And once the
suit is filed, the real parties in interest are extremely limited in their ability
to control the course of the litigation.35 As a result, suits may be filed that
have a positive value to their attorneys, but do not ultimately benefit the
shareholders or the plaintiff corporation.
Second, reduced monitoring in shareholder litigation can increase agency
costs by allowing attorneys to seek a higher percentage of the recovery for
their fee. To understand this point, imagine a shareholder lawsuit in which
the defendants agree to pay $1 million to the plaintiffs. If the plaintiffs'
attorney receives twenty-five percent of the recovery, the attorney will walk
30. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 21, at 22 ("Litigation agency costs arise because
suits are often brought by a named plaintiff that has no substantial ownership interest in the
corporation."); Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 3-4.
31. See id.
32. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 17.
33. See Anthony Sebok, Dispatchesfrom the Tort Wars, 85 TEx. L. REv. 1465, 1492
(2007) (reviewing WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS,
MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS (2004), HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND
REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES (2004), and Tom BAKER,
THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH (2005)) ("A rational self-interested 'investor'- .. . the
plaintiffs' lawyer would be incentivized to take steps to increase his client's expected return,
since he now owns part of that return.").
34. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 21 ("The attorneys themselves are responsible
for initiating the litigation and do not rely on clients to come to them with cases.").
35. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Kossoff, Director Independence and Derivative Suit
Settlements, 1983 DUKE L.J. 645, 657 ("Although the derivative plaintiff is the party that
initiates the suit, courts routinely approve derivative settlements over the plaintiffs
vehement objection." (footnotes omitted)).
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away with $250,000 and the shareholder class will receive $750,000, with
the shareholder representative receiving his pro rata share of this amount.
But what would stop the plaintiffs' attorney from seeking a greater
percentage of the recovery, say thirty percent?3 6 The defendants should not
care-they pay the same amount either way, so it should not matter to them
how this amount is divided between the plaintiffs' attorney and the class.3 7
The shareholder representative should theoretically be monitoring the case,
but as discussed above, many shareholder plaintiffs do not have the
financial incentives to do the type of detailed monitoring required to
prevent marginally higher fees.
It is one thing for the plaintiffs' attorney to seek a higher percentage of
the recovery. But there are other, even more egregious possibilities. For
example, the defendant and the plaintiffs' attorney could conspire to craft a
settlement that benefits both of them at the expense of the absent class
members. 38 Instead of the $1 million settlement outlined above, what if the
defendant offered $900,000, but agreed to look the other way if the
plaintiffs' attorney sought forty percent of the recovery? In this case, the
settlement would be in the defendants' interests because they would pay
less, and it would be in the attorney's interest because he or she would
receive more.3 9 The only people who would be hurt by this settlement are
36. See Tim Oliver Brandi, The Strike Suit: A Common Problem of the Derivative Suit
and Shareholder Class Action, 98 DICK. L. REv. 355, 389 (1994) (arguing that the interests
of shareholder plaintiffs and their attorneys "may conflict since the fee award comes out of
the damage recovery so that any increase in the fee award necessarily leads to a decrease in
plaintiffs' recovery").
37. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 25-26 ("Defendants in common benefit and
fee-shifting cases typically wish to minimize the sum of three costs: the costs of the relief on
the merits, the costs of their own attorney's fees, and the costs of the plaintiffs' attorney's
fees. Defendants are typically indifferent about how the total cost of litigation is distributed
among these elements.").
38. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private Attorney General: Why the Model of
the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 MD. L. REv. 215, 232 (1983) ("The
possibility of collusive settlements grows in direct proportion to the attorney's
'independence' from his client. . . . To say this is not to claim that plaintiffs' attorneys
systematically subordinate the class recovery to their own fee, but it is to say that the
plaintiff s attorney is subject to a serious conflict of interest."); Susanna M. Kim, Conflicting
Ideologies of Group Litigation: Who May Challenge Settlements in Class Actions and
Derivative Suits?, 66 TENN. L. REv. 81, 124 (1998) ("There is always the possibility that
plaintiffs' attorneys will conspire with the defendants to exchange a small settlement for a
large award of attorneys' fees.").
39. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 26 ("Thus the conditions are present for a
bargain under which the plaintiffs' attorneys agree to a lower overall settlement on the
merits of the litigation in exchange for a higher fee.").
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the shareholders who receive significantly less than they otherwise would
have.
The defendants might try an even bolder strategy. Instead of offering $1
million or even $900,000, they might offer no money at all to the plaintiffs.
Instead, they might put on the table what is known as a "non-monetary
40
settlement," or a settlement that includes consideration other than money.
In this instance, the defendants will probably still have to pay some money
to the plaintiffs' attorney in fees, but the overall cost to the defendants will
be much less than if they had to pay both the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs'
attorney. And, depending on the amount of the fees and the upfront costs to
litigate, the plaintiffs' attorney may end up with more money in his or her
pockets as well.
This last example is not as far-fetched as it may sound. Non-monetary
settlements are surprisingly common in shareholder litigation.41 Until
approximately 2015, nearly all merger class actions ended with nonmonetary settlements, with the consideration of additional disclosures to
shareholders about the merger.42 And despite the non-monetary nature of
the settlements, the plaintiffs' attorneys still received six-figure fees,
averaging $500,000 in these cases.43 Similarly, in shareholder derivative
40. See Coffee, supra note 9, at 716 ("The availability of these bloodless settlements
gives rise to a set of circumstances in which it can appear economically irrational not to
settle. By settling, neither side loses anything, and both recoup their legal expenses from the
corporation (and thus indirectly from the shareholders).").
41. See Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the PeppercornSettlement in Merger Litigation:
An Empirical Analysis and a Proposalfor Reform, 93 TEx. L. REV. 557, 559 (2015) ("In
most settled cases, the only relief provided to shareholders consists of supplemental
disclosures in the merger proxy statement. In compensation for the benefit produced by these
settlements--often worth no more, in the words of a famous jurist, than a 'peppercorn'plaintiffs' attorneys receive a fee award." (footnote omitted)).
42. See OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2014 M&A LITIGATION 5 (2015),
https://www.cornerstone.com/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2014-Review
[hereinafter KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2014]; RAv SINHA, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH,
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING ACQUISITION OF PUBLIC COMPANIES: REVIEW OF

2015

1H 2016 M&A LITIGATION 5 (2016), https://www.comerstone.com/Publications/
Reports/Shareholder-Litigation-Involving-Acquisitions-2016.
43. See OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SETTLEMENTS OF SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION, at
3
(2014),
https://www.comerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Settlements-of-M-and-AShareholder-Litigation [hereinafter KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2013]; see also Matthew D. Cain
& Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and
Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 479 (2015) ("The average attorneys' fees for disclosures
[between 2005-2011] are $749,000, considerably lower than other settlement types. This
AND
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suits, plaintiff corporations-the real parties in interest in these suits-often
agree to settle the derivative claims in exchange for making relatively
modest changes to their corporate governance practices.4 4
In theory, non-monetary settlements might have value.45 There may well
be situations in which additional disclosures or corporate governance
reforms may be more valuable to the plaintiffs than money.4 6 Yet, they also
raise a risk that attorneys and defendants may benefit themselves at the
expense of the shareholders or the plaintiff corporation.47 And numerous
empirical studies have found that these settlements often offer little value to
plaintiffs, illustrating that these settlements can be abused by plaintiffs'
attorneys. 48 As a result, whatever theoretical value these types of
settlements might have, they seem to have less value in practice.
Bringing the analysis full circle, in most areas of the law, the legal
system does not worry about the merits of settlements. Instead, it trusts
plaintiffs to monitor their attorneys and ensure that any agreed-upon
settlements reflect their best interests. In shareholder litigation, however,
the plaintiffs are often absent class members who lack the financial
incentives to closely monitor the litigation. As a result, the legal system
cannot rely on them to ensure that these suits are litigated in a way that
reflects the best interests. Instead, they must rely on different gatekeepers.
As we will see, however, these gatekeepers are not the same across
different types of shareholder lawsuits.

supports the principle put forth by some that 'disclosure only' settlements are not highly
valued by the litigant participants or the courts.").
44. See Jessica Erickson, Corporate Governance in the Courtroom: An Empirical
Analysis, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1749 (2010) (analyzing corporate governance settlements
in derivative suits filed in federal court).
45. See id. (discussing analytical frameworks to evaluate the benefits of non-monetary
settlements); Fisch et al., supra note 41, at 570 ("Disclosure-only settlements can benefit the
shareholder class if the required disclosures allow the shareholders to exercise their voting
rights in a more meaningful manner.").
46. See Erickson, supra note 44 (explaining how non-monetary settlements might cure
an underlying governance problem at the corporation that led to the problems challenged in
the suit).
47. See Macey & Miller, supra note 8, at 94-95.
48. See Erickson, supra note 44, at 1755 (explaining that "corporate governance
settlements often fail to live up to their potential because they include reforms that are
unlikely to benefit corporations or their shareholders"); Fisch et al., supra note 41, at 561
("[D]isclosure-only settlements do not appear to affect shareholder voting in any way. We
also find only weak evidence that consideration-increase settlements increase shareholder
voting in favor of a transaction.").
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II. The Diverse Gatekeepers in ShareholderLitigation
Part I explained how different types of shareholder lawsuits all face the
same challenge in ensuring that plaintiffs' attorneys make litigation
decisions that are in the plaintiffs' best interests. Yet in the three main types
of representative shareholder lawsuits-securities class actions, merger
suits, and derivative suits-each choose different gatekeepers to monitor
the attorneys' conduct. This Part II explains the different gatekeepers in
these lawsuits, as well as the pros and cons of each.
A. Securities Class Actions
In 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
("PSLRA"),49 which overhauled the procedural rules governing securities
class actions. Pursuant to the PSLRA, there are now two primary
gatekeepers in securities class actions: lead plaintiffs and Congress. The
subsections below discuss the PSLRA's effectiveness in reducing agency
costs in securities class actions.
1. Lead Plaintiffs
One of the PSLRA's primary goals was to increase the role of large,
institutional shareholders. Prior to 1995, if multiple shareholders filed
parallel suits, courts had significant discretion to decide which shareholder
would oversee the litigation.5 The PSLRA significantly limited that
discretion, creating a presumption that the lead plaintiff should be the
shareholder applicant with the largest financial stake in the litigation.52 The
PSLRA also requires the lead plaintiff, "subject to the approval of the court,
[to] select and retain counsel to represent the class." 53
According to the legislative history, this provision was designed to
-54
increase the role of institutional plaintiffs in securities class actions.
The
49. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2)
(2012).
50. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995) ("The Committee intends to increase the
likelihood that institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs . . . ."); H.R. REP. No. 104369, at 34 (1995) ("The Conference Committee seeks to increase the likelihood that
institutional investors will serve as lead plaintiffs .... ).
51. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring:
How InstitutionalInvestors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE
L.J. 2053, 2062 (1995) ("Courts most often appoint as lead counsel the lawyer who files the
first complaint.").
52. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(J)(bb).
53. Id. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
54. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 11 (1995); H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 34 (1995).
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idea was that institutional investors with large financial stakes in the
litigation would monitor the cases more closely than smaller shareholders. 5
In many ways, the PSLRA has succeeded in this goal. Approximately twothirds of settled cases have at least one institutional investor as lead
plaintiff.5 6 These institutions are largely labor unions and public pension

funds, rather than the mutual funds envisioned by Congress, 7 but they
nonetheless tend to have substantial stakes in the outcome of the lawsuits.
Overall, these institutional investors have succeeded in lowering the fees
of their attorneys. One study, for example, found that cases in which state
pension funds serve as lead plaintiff result in lower attorneys' fees as a
percentage of the total recovery than cases in which an individual served as
lead plaintiff.5 Additionally, larger funds negotiate for even lower fees.

59

These findings confirm Congress's intuition that institutional investors have
greater incentives to protect absent class members.
And the reliance on institutional investors as gatekeepers in these
lawsuits makes sense. Unlike many other types of class actions, securities
class actions typically end with multi-million-dollar settlements, o and
many class members have multimillion-dollar claims themselves.6 As a
result, they have greater financial incentives to monitor the litigation than a
55. See Elliott J. Weiss, The Lead PlaintiffProvisionsof the PSLRA After a Decade, or
"Look What's Happened to My Baby", 61 VAND. L. REV. 543, 547 (2008) (stating that the
PSLRA was based on research predicting that "if class action procedures could be reformed
to make it easier for institutional investors with large losses to become lead plaintiffs and to
select the attorneys who would represent the class, those institutions would have an
economic incentive to retain and to monitor class counsel so as to reduce substantially the
agency costs associated with securities class action litigation").
56. See BULANETAL., supra note 14, at 16.
57. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 34-35 (1995); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Optimal
Lead Plaintiffs, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (2011) (arguing that "because other eligible
institutions like banks, mutual funds, and insurance companies maintain commercial
relationships with the defendants or defendants' customers, public and union pension funds
are the institutions that typically take on the lead-plaintiff role").
58. See Stephen J. Choi et al., The Price of Pay to Play in Securities Class Actions, 8 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 650, 678 (2011) ("We also find that local pension funds, although
generally having smaller stakes in class action recoveries, appear to negotiate lower fees
than individuals.").
59. See id. at 651 ("We also find that larger funds, of all types, tend to negotiate lower
attorney fees.").
60. See BULAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 1 (finding that average settlement size of
securities class actions in 2015 was $37.9 million).
61. See generally James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Leaving Money on the Table: Do
Institutional Investors Fail to File Claims in Securities Class Actions?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q.
855, 855-65 (2002).
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stereotypical class member with only a few dollars at stake.62 Framed
another way, securities class actions may be one of the only types of class
actions able to rely on lead plaintiffs to monitor the litigation because it is
one of the only types of class actions with class members who have
substantial financial stakes in the outcome. As a result, it is not surprising
that securities class actions, unlike many other types of class actions, have
put greater monitoring responsibilities on lead plaintiffs.
On the other hand, the reliance on institutional shareholders has not
cured all of the problems in securities class actions. First, the PSLRA did
not mandate that large shareholders control all securities class actions.
Instead, it only stated that, in most instances, the lead plaintiff should be the
63
applicant with the largest financial stake in the litigation. If all applicants
are individual shareholders with small holdings, the lead plaintiff will be
selected from among this group. Indeed, post-PSLRA studies find that there
is a subset of securities class actions that continues to be controlled by
individual investors, and this subset, on the whole, tends to involve smaller,
potentially more frivolous claims.64
Moreover, as soon as the legal system gave institutional investors more
power, it also created incentives for plaintiffs' attorneys to curry favor with
these investors. Most of the institutions that serve as lead plaintiff are
65
pension funds, s and most of these pension funds are controlled by
politicians who often have to campaign to retain their current seat or have
66
an eyes on other elected offices. Empirical evidence suggests that at least
some of these firms make campaign contributions to these politicians in the

62. See Weiss, supra note 55, at 574 (stating that "a class member with a considerable
sum at stake was likely to be more committed than a court to ensuring that all claims
asserted on behalf of the plaintiff class were prosecuted vigorously").
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(J)(bb).
64. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Does the PlaintiffMatter? An Empirical
Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1587, 1620-22
(2006) (finding that cases controlled by individuals or groups of individuals involve lead
plaintiffs with small dollar value and respective stakes in the cases and therefore "[i]t seems
apparent that these claimants cannot be realistically expected to engage in costly monitoring
of class counsel").
65. See BULAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 16 (finding that approximately forty percent of
settlements in securities class actions have involved a public pension fund as lead plaintiff).
66. See David H. Webber, Is "Pay-to-Play" Driving Public Pension Fund Activism in
Securities Class Actions? An Empirical Study, 90 B.U. L. REv. 2031, 2044-46 (2010).
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hopes of inducing the funds that these politicians control to hire them as
lead counsel.
For example, in Mississippi, the Attorney General oversees the state's
retirement system. 8 Starting in 2004, plaintiffs' firms started to make
considerable donations to the Attorney General's campaign, comprising
approximately a significant percentage of the total contributions to his
campaign from 2007 through 2009.69 These campaign contributions
seemingly paid off. The same law firms that donated to his campaign were
also chosen to serve as lead counsel or co-lead counsel in securities class
actions in which the Mississippi retirement system served as one of the lead
plaintiffs.7 0 Many of these cases ended with sizable settlements that resulted
in substantial fees for the law firms. Mississippi is far from the only state
subject to allegations that plaintiffs' law firms must "pay to play" when it
comes to pension funds' selection of lead counsel.72
This influence matters. As noted above, state pension funds generally
bargain for lower attorneys' fees in securities class actions than do
individual investors. 73 This fee differential, however, largely disappears
when researchers control for campaign contributions made to candidates
with influence over the pension funds. And this effect is particularly
pronounced when it comes to the funds whose officials receive the largest
campaign contributions and the funds that have a long-term relationship
with a single firm.74 This data shows that, although we might expect that
public pension funds that repeatedly rely on the same firm might bargain

67. See, e.g., Choi et al., supra note 58, at 653-54; Drew T. Johnson-Skinner, Note,
Paying-to-Playin Securities Class Actions: A Look at Lawyers' Campaign Contributions, 84
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1725, 1728 (2009). This point, however, is not without controversy. See,
e.g., Webber, supra note 66, at 2044.
68. 2014 Miss. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 81, http://www.ago.state.ms.us/wp-content/
uploads/2014/12/AGO-FY2014-Annual-Report.pdf ("Special Assistant Attorney General
Jane Mapp serve[d] as legal counsel to the Public Employees' Retirement System of
Mississippi (PERS). PERS is responsible for administering the Public Employees'
Retirement System .... ).

69.

STEPHEN J. CHOI ET AL., U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, FREQUENT FILER:

6-8 (2013), http://www.instituteforlegal
reform.com/uploads/sites/1/FrequentFilersFINAL.pdf.
70. Id. at 8.
71. Id. at 8-9.
72. Id. at 14 n.2 (explaining that states such as Louisiana, North Carolina, and
Oklahoma face similar problems).
73. Choi et al., supra note 58, at 650.
74. See id. at 651.
REPEAT PLAINTIFFS IN SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
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for lower fees, in fact the opposite happens. Experience matters, but not in
the way we might hope.
More broadly, institutional investors have not exercised their new
monitoring responsibilities as well or as creatively as lawmakers might
have hoped. Although institutional investors are correlated with lower fees,
empirical studies have found that this reduction does not result from ex ante
bargaining between these investors and their lawyers, as Congress had
hoped. 5 Instead, in most cases, courts still set fees after the parties have
agreed on a settlement. 6 And this lack of bargaining has had a predictable
impact on fees, with studies demonstrating that "courts in most cases set
fees in precisely the same manner they did before passage of the PSLRAex post, after a settlement has already been reached." 7 7 As a result, while
fees have gone down, the reduction might not be as much as Congress had
hoped.
Pulling this analysis together, ever since the enactment of the PSLRA,
securities class actions have relied on institutional investors to serve as
monitors in securities class actions, and for good reason given that these
institutions often have multimillion-dollar stakes in the litigation. And, on
average, this reliance has paid off with lower attorneys' fees, which means
the class ends up with more money. But there are downsides to this reliance
as well, as pay-to-play allegations demonstrate, and limits to what
institutional investors have been able to accomplish. As we shall see,
however, they are not the only monitors in securities class actions.
Congress also claimed an important role for itself in the PSLRA.
2. Congress
When it came to tinkering with the rules governing securities class
actions in the PSLRA, Congress did not stop with the lead plaintiff
provisions described above. It also included heightened pleading
requirements, which make it more difficult for plaintiffs to survive a motion
to dismiss and proceed to discovery. The PSLRA requires that, in any case
in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant made a false or misleading
fact (i.e., almost all securities class actions), the plaintiff must specify "each
statement alleged to have been misleading [and] the reason or reasons why
the statement is misleading."7 Moreover, "if an allegation regarding the
75. Lynn A. Baker et al., Is the Price Right? An Empirical Study of Fee-Setting in
Securities Class Actions, 115 COLUM. L. REv. 1371, 1379-80 (2015).
76. Id. at 1380.
77. Id.
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012).
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statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint
shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed." 79 In
addition, when it comes to allegations of scienter, or the defendant's state of
mind, the PSLRA requires that the plaintiff allege "with particularity facts
giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind."o The PSLRA is one of the only federal statutes that relies
on heightened pleading requirements to sort cases, and it is a significant
break from the less stringent pleading requirements under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 82
The PSLRA requires judges to dismiss a securities class action that does
not comply with these heightened pleading requirements. 83 At first glance,
therefore, these provisions appear to give judges, rather than Congress,
extra monitoring responsibility in securities class actions. And in many
ways, judges do have more power because Congress deputized them to sort
the good cases from the bad. Judges, in other words, are the monitors on the
front lines, making the case-by-case decisions on whether specific claims
meet the given pleading requirements.
But judges have always played this role, albeit usually under a different
pleading standard. Regardless of whether securities class actions are
governed by Rule 8, Rule 9, or the new pleading requirements of the
PSLRA, judges must decide whether a given complaint meets the relevant
pleading standard. 84 And judges play this role in every case, or at least in
every case where the defendant challenges the sufficiency of a pleading.
The pleading standards may be different, but the role of judges in applying
these standards is not. As a result, judges do play a monitoring role in
securities class actions, but this role is not fundamentally different than in
any other type of federal civil case. 85

79. Id.
80. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2).
81. See Jessica Erickson, HeightenedProcedure, 102 IOWA L. REv. 61, 85-86 (2016).
82. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 8 (establishing a notice pleading standard for most
civil claims).
83. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) ("In any private action arising under this chapter, the
court shall, on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the requirements of
paragraphs (1) and (2) are not met.").
84. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
85. This is not to say that judges' role in securities class actions is exactly the same.
First, a heightened pleading standard may have an impact on how judges approach the case
and see their own role. As scholars have noted, judges use heuristics to evaluate claims on a
motion to dismiss, and they may see their own role differently when they are asked by
Congress to use a more skeptical eye. See Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C.
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The role of Congress, however, is different. In the PSLRA, Congress
claimed for itself a greater gatekeeper role to sort the good cases from the
bad. In most types of federal cases, Congress sits back and lets the normal
Rule 8 pleading standards do their work. In securities class actions,
however, Congress intervened, making ex ante decisions about the types of
cases that should survive. Congress, in other words, is the ultimate
decision-maker in these cases, crafting the standard that is then used in
federal courts across the country in deciding motions to dismiss.
So how has Congress performed in this gatekeeping role? The empirical
evidence is decidedly mixed. The PSLRA succeeded in reducing the
number of frivolous cases, exactly the result that Congress wanted. 6 Yet it
also reduced the number of non-frivolous cases, especially those in which
there is no hard evidence of fraud, such as a restatement or SEC
enforcement action. 7 As one study concluded, "the PSLRA operated less
like a selective deterrence against fraud and more as a simple tax on all
litigation (including meritorious suits)."" As a result, Congress may have
inserted itself into securities class actions, but it cannot argue that it has
been an especially effective gatekeeper.
B. Merger Class Actions
Merger class actions have faced even greater agency cost challenges than
securities class actions, and these challenges have been addressed in
radically different ways. In 2014, approximately ninety-three percent of
large mergers and acquisitions were challenged in court.8 9 Whatever one
may think about corporate boards, it is hard to imagine that they breach
their fiduciary duties nearly every time they approve a large merger or
DAVIs L. REv. 903, 946 (2002) (arguing that the rhetoric in decisions on motions to dismiss
in securities class actions "arguably reveals that the courts are not simply applying prePSLRA standards designed to sort the good cases from the bad" but instead are "disdainful
of the plaintiffs' attorneys before them and aggravated by the length and complexity of the
complaints").
86. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 35, 64-66 (2009).
87. Id.; see also Eric Talley & Gudrun Johnsen, Corporate Governance, Executive
Compensation and Securities Litigation 4 (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch., Olin Research Paper
No. 04-7, 2004), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=536963 (presenting
data "that even if the PSLRA reduced frivolous litigation (as its proponents claim), it likely
deterred meritorious litigation as well, and in such proportions as to swamp the deterring
effects on non-meritorious suits").
88. Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598, 623 (2007).
89. See KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2014, supra note 42, at 1.
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acquisition. 90 Under significant pressure to protect the shareholder litigation
franchise, Delaware and other states explored ways to reduce frivolous
merger litigation. Rather than passing a PSLRA-style law, however, states
have relied on two other gatekeepers-judges and the targeted companies
themselves. This section examines how these gatekeepers came into power
and their mixed success in exercising it.
1. Judges
Until fairly recently, judges did not have to worry about merger class
actions. Shareholders would occasionally challenge a corporate board's
decision to merge or be acquired, especially if there was a controlling
shareholder involved, 91 but these cases did not raise serious agency cost
concerns. Some of these cases were good, some were bad, but courts were
largely able to tell the difference.
This all changed over the last several years. Between 2007 and 2014, the
percentage of large mergers acquisitions challenged in court increased from
forty-four percent to ninety-three percent. 92 There does not appear to have
been a single event that precipitated this change, 93 but regardless of the
cause, lawyers figured out that these cases were relatively easy money.
Traditionally, a shareholder challenging a merger or acquisition would
allege that the price was too low or the terms too onerous. 94 This type of
claim would require wrangling about the actual value of the company and,
if the plaintiffs were successful, would typically end with a higher deal

90. See James D. Cox, How Understanding the Nature of Corporate Norms Can
Prevent Their Destruction by Settlements, 66 DuKE L.J. 501, 505 (2016) (arguing that the
prevalence of deal litigation provides "ample reason to believe that more is afoot in
corporate litigation than an abundance of potential wrongdoing").
91. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
92. KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2014, supra note 42, at 1.
93. See, e.g., Edward B. Micheletti & Jenness E. Parker, Multi-JurisdictionalLitigation:
Who Caused This Problem, and Can It Be Fixed?, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2012) ("Many
believe, for example, that the advent of multi-jurisdictional litigation was a reaction by the
plaintiffs' bar to certain unfavorable rulings in Delaware from a stockholder point of
view."); Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative
Shareholder Suits and Its Application to MultijurisdictionalLitigation, 106 Nw. U. L. REv.
1753, 1769 (2012) (arguing that the PSLRA contributed to the rise of merger litigation in
part because the PSLRA's lead plaintiff provisions mean that "[n]ewer, smaller firms with
fewer financial resources will only be able to enter the market if they find niches where they
can litigate what they perceive as good cases without investing large amounts of resources
but still earn sufficient fees to stay in business").
94. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 464-67 (1977).
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price or altered deal terms. Defendants would fight these claims to avoid
risking the merger and/or paying a significant cash settlement. 95
Shareholder plaintiffs (or their lawyers) realized more recently that they
would have an easier time if they challenged a company's disclosures about
a merger, rather than the merger itself.96 If the plaintiffs alleged that the
company's disclosures were inadequate, then the company could fix the
problem by making additional disclosures, rather than by paying money.97
Most companies would rather make a few additional disclosures rather than
re-negotiate the deal or pay millions in damages. 98 And, even if the
companies thought their existing disclosures were adequate, they would
rather disclose a little more information about the deal than pay to fight the
case and risk holding up the deal.
As a result, more and more merger cases now end with the prototypical,
non-monetary settlements discussed in Part I. In 2014, only eight percent of
the settlements in merger cases involved cash consideration, while nearly
eighty percent included additional disclosures or other non-monetary
changes to the deal terms. 99 The average fees resulting from these
settlements were approximately half a million dollars. 00 This relatively
easy money prompted lawsuits of most deals in more than one jurisdiction,
as multiple lawyers tried to get a piece of the litigation pie. It became

95. This is not to say that these settlements were utterly different from the settlements
we see today. Corporations could make relatively minor changes to the terms of the deal to
settle the case, later bringing in the plaintiffs to bless the changes and give them their
release, a move that the Delaware Court of Chancery called a "Kabuki dance." See In re
Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 945 (Del. Ch. 2010). This pattern was thus a
precursor to the disclosure-only settlements that would soon follow.
96. See Fisch et al., supra note 41, at 564-65 ("Although the courts have long
recognized that the board in a merger is responsible for providing shareholders with
sufficient information to approve or reject the transaction on an informed basis, the
suggestion that directors have an independent duty of disclosure and that directors can
breach that duty by failing to provide shareholders with information material to the vote is of
recent vintage." (footnote omitted)).
97. See Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys' Fee Awards: The Delaware Court of
Chancery's Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 669, 686-87 (2013) ("[M]uch of the improved disclosure can be attributed, at least in
part, to the disclosure-only line of cases.").
98. Cf Cox, supra note 90, at 510 ("[D]isclosure-only settlements are an efficient
medium for addressing deal litigation: the defense lawyers' clients are happy, and the
plaintiffs' counsel are paid.").
99. KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2014, supra note 42, at 5.
100. KOUMRIAN, REVIEW OF 2013, supra note 43, at 1.
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commonplace for corporations to pay a "deal tax" to plaintiffs' attorneys
every time they entered into a large merger or acquisition. 0 1
There was no PSLRA that could solve this problem. These cases were
filed under state law, often in state court. The federal government could
preempt state law or provide an exclusive forum for these cases in federal
court,

102

but doing so would upset the traditional role of states in corporate

law, especially Delaware, given the significant percentage of companies
incorporated there. 103 As a result, the federal government had a limited
ability to solve the problem. Instead, the responsibility rested with states,
and more specifically Delaware courts, to address the problems that these
cases raised.
For several years, judges in Delaware decried the developments in
merger litigation. 104 In January 2015, however, Delaware took action,
rejecting a non-monetary settlement in a merger class action filed against
Trulia, Inc. 105 This case challenged Zillow, Inc.'s acquisition of Trulia, Inc.
on the grounds that Trulia's board had failed to properly value the
company. 10 6 Although the plaintiffs challenged the deal terms, they agreed
to settle the claims in exchange for additional disclosures about the deal. 107
In rejecting the settlement, Chancellor Bouchard roundly criticized
merger litigation more generally. He stated that "far too often such
litigation serves no useful purpose for stockholders." 08 The Chancellor
continued:

101. See K. Tyler O'Connell et al., Reducing the "Deal Tax": Delaware's Recent
Scrutiny of Nonmonetary Settlements, Bus. L. TODAY, Oct. 2015, at 1.
102. Cf Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112
Stat. 3227, 3231 (preempting state securities class actions).
103. See, e.g., J. Travis Laster, A Milder Prescriptionfor the Peppercorn Settlement
Problem in Merger Litigation, 93 TEx. L. REv. SEE ALso 129, 132 (2015) (arguing against
"radical surgery on Delaware corporate law by removing the entire subject of transactionrelated disclosure").
104. See, e.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Request for Attorneys' Fees and the
Court's Rulings at 73-74, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., C.A. No. 7930-VCL (Del. Ch.
July
8,
2015),
http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/files/2015/07/acevedovaeroflexsettlementhearingtranscript.pdf (refusing to approve the intergalactic releases that have been
previously accepted by the courts); Transcript of Settlement Hearing Rulings of the Court at
73, In re Aruba Networks, Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015), http://
www.dandodiary.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/265/2015/10/Aruba-Networks-Transcript.pdf.
105. In re Trulia, Inc. S'holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 907-08 (Del. Ch. 2016).

106. Id. at 889.
107. Id. at 887.
108. Id. at 891-92.
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Instead, it serves only to generate fees for certain lawyers who
are regular players in the enterprise of routinely filing hastily
drafted complaints on behalf of stockholders on the heels of the
public announcement of a deal and settling quickly on terms that
yield no monetary compensation to the stockholders they
represent. 109
He announced that the court would "reexamine[]" its "historical
predisposition toward approving disclosure settlements." 10 He also
promised that the court would "disfavor" disclosure-only settlements that
do not involve "plainly material" information.1
Since the Trulia decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery has largely
stayed true to its word. It has rejected several settlements, 112 and a few
courts in other jurisdictions have followed suit.113 The fallout from Trulia
has been both positive and negative. On the positive side, the percentage of
large mergers and acquisitions that were challenged in court was down
precipitously-from a high of ninety-four percent in 2013 to sixty-four
percent in the first half of 2016.114 On the negative side, Trulia did not
completely solve the problem of frivolous merger litigation.115 Although it
reduced the incidence of this litigation, it is still hard to imagine that
corporate boards breach their fiduciary duty in nearly two-thirds of large
mergers and acquisitions. And in the suits that remain, non-disclosure
116
settlements remain common.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 896.
111. Id. at 898.
112. See Edward Micheletti et al., Trulia's Impact on Deal Litigation in Delaware and

Beyond, LAw360 (Nov. 28, 2016, 9:47 AM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/864466/
trulia-s-impact-on-deal-litigation-in-delaware-and-beyond
("Disclosure-based settlements
before the Court of Chancery have fallen out of favor.").
113. See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718 (7th Cir. 2016);
Vergiev v. Aguero, et al., No. L-2776-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2016). But see Corwin v. British
Am. Tobacco PLC, No. 14 CVS 8130, 2016 WL 635191 (N.C. Super. Ct. Feb. 17, 2016)
(approving the partial settlement despite counsel's objection that Trulia should be
considered).
114. SINHA, supranote 42, at 1.
115. See Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can Fix
the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can't, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN

(Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, eds., forthcoming 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2855950 (describing the limitations of
CHANGING TIMES

Trulia).
116. See SINHA, supra note 42, at 1 (finding that post-Trulia "monetary consideration

paid to shareholders has remained relatively rare").
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Trulia has also incentivized plaintiffs to try their chances outside of
Delaware. A few courts have adopted Trulia,1 1 7 but others have not,
continuing to approve disclosure-only settlements." And even in the
jurisdictions that have adopted Trulia, plaintiffs may think their chances
under the "plainly material" standard are better outside of Delaware. As a
result, the forum shopping that plagued merger litigation before Trulia
continues.119
This impact shows the difficulty of relying on judges as the primary
monitors in shareholder lawsuits. These lawsuits can often be filed in more
than one jurisdiction. As a result, if one court starts to crack down, plaintiffs
can just move to other jurisdictions that are less attuned to the problems.
Given the costs of litigating a merger case to conclusion, it may be cheaper
for plaintiffs to file outside of Delaware and the defendants not to fight the
choice of forum and simply agree to nuisance settlements.
Moreover, the Trulia approach depends on judges with the knowledge
and incentives to act as strict monitors. The Delaware Court of Chancery
judges are experts in Delaware corporate law and were well-aware of the
rising problems in merger litigation. 120 They are also presumably motivated
to protect the shareholder litigation franchise and protect the court's
reputation as the overseer of corporate litigation. And yet even with their
knowledge and incentives, it still took them several years to crack down on
a situation that everyone agreed had gotten out of hand, and even now they
have not been able to completely solve the problem.
Few other courts face similar knowledge or incentives. A federal judge,
for example, may handle a securities class action occasionally, but is
unlikely to be an expert in all the ins and outs of these cases. 121 If a

117. See, e.g., Walgreen, 832 F.3d at 725 (adopting the "plainly material" standard from
Trulia in an opinion by Judge Posner on the Seventh Circuit); Vergiev v. Aguero, No. L2276-15 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 6, 2016).
118. See, e.g., In re Sigma-Aldrich Corp. S'holder Litig., No. 1422-CCO9684 (Mo. Cir.
Ct. Aug. 19, 2015) (approving the disclosure-only settlement); see also Murphy v.
Synergetics USA Inc., No. 1511-CC00778 (Mo. Cir. Ct. July 29, 2016).
119. See Griffith, supra note 115, at 2 (arguing that the belief that Trulia would solve the
problems in merger litigation appear to be "wishful thinking").
120. See, e.g., Laster, supra note 103, at 134 ("The Delaware courts are different. The
Court of Chancery's jurisdiction is focused. It does not hear criminal cases, and a substantial
majority of the court's caseload concerns mergers and other transactions.").
121. See id. at 133 ("[F]ederal courts hear disclosure cases within a broader docket that
encompasses criminal cases, lawsuits invoking myriad other federal statutes, and state law
diversity actions. Docket composition varies across districts, so while it may well be that
judges in the Southern District of New York and other commercial centers have developed
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shareholder lawsuit is simply one more case on a judge's docket, it is
unlikely that the judge will know about the specific problems in those types
of suits or devote the time necessary to try to solve them. And even if one
judge takes on this effort, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of other
judges will join the effort and thus have a meaningful impact across the
legal system.
Indeed, any excitement that one might get from Trulia must be tempered
by the PSLRA's failure to make judges more active monitors in securities
class actions. In addition to the provisions described above, the PSLRA also
mandates that judges conduct a Rule 11 inquiry at the end of every
securities class action.122 Yet, despite the mandatory nature of this
provision, federal judges are largely ignoring it. A recent empirical study
found that judges conduct this "mandatory" review in only fourteen percent
of the cases. 123 And even in these cases, their review is typically
perfunctory. 124 This experience suggests that it is not always easy to get
judges to serve as more active monitors. Delaware aside, most judges
simply do not have the time or inclination to actively monitor shareholder
lawsuits.
As we shall see, however, Delaware is not relying on judges alone to
solve the merger litigation crisis. It has also deputized corporations and
their shareholders to police these suits through ex ante restrictions in their
governing documents.
2. Bylaws and Charters
Corporate law has long allowed corporations to alter default rules in their
charters and bylaws. 125 It is therefore surprising that it took corporations

takeover-disclosure expertise, it is not clear that such a claim can be made about the federal
court system as a whole.").
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(c)(1) (2012) ("In any private action arising under this chapter,
upon final adjudication of the action, the court shall include in the record specific findings
regarding compliance by each party and each attorney representing any party with each
requirement of Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to any complaint,
responsive pleading, or dispositive motion.").
123. See M. Todd Henderson & William H.J. Hubbard, Judicial Noncompliance with
Mandatory Procedural Rules Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 44 J.
LEGAL STUD. 587, 590 (2015).
124. See id. at 599 (stating that "consistent with our results based on proxies for effort or
motivation-that a judge will do so only when the effort involved is minimal").
125. See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 235 (Del. 2008)
(holding that shareholders can amend bylaws to change the "process and procedures by
which [corporate] decisions are made").
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until recently to use this power to address frivolous shareholder lawsuits. In
2010, the Delaware Court of Chancery publicly acknowledged that it was
having difficulty policing merger cases because parties could just settle the
suit in other jurisdictions to avoid the court's oversight.126 The court
suggested that defendants could avoid litigating in other jurisdictions by
including a forum selection clause in their charters, stating that all intracorporate disputes must be filed in Delaware. 127
Many corporations follow the court's suggestions, especially those that
were already amending their governing documents before announcing a
merger. These corporations were able to include a forum selection clause in
their charters or bylaws before they were inevitably sued by shareholders
upon announcement of a merger. 128 Soon, corporations began to experiment
by putting other heightened procedures into these documents, including feeshifting provisions. 129 These provisions caused concern among
shareholders' and plaintiffs' counsel because they made representative
shareholders liable for all of the defendants' fees if the suit was
unsuccessful, even though these shareholders would only receive their pro
rata shares of the recovery if the suit was successful. 130 This combination of
126. See In re Revlon, Inc. S'holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) ("The
limiting function of the defendants' ability to seek dismissal, however, operates imperfectly
when defendants can routinely purchase global releases by paying transactionally immaterial
plaintiffs' fees, and when defendants rationally prefer to do so.").
127. See id. ("[I]f boards of directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum
would provide an efficient and value-promoting locus for dispute resolution, then
corporations are free to respond with charter provisions selecting an exclusive forum for
intra-entity disputes.").
128. Although the Delaware Court of Chancery had originally stated that forum-selection
clauses should go in corporate charters, it became far more common for corporations to put
them into their bylaws. This difference mattered because charter provisions have to be
adopted by both the board and the shareholders, while bylaws provisions can generally be
adopted by the board on its own. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011)
(providing that corporations can allow shareholders or the board to amend the bylaws) with
id. § 242(b) (providing that both the shareholders and the board must approve amendments
to the charter). As a result, corporations favored putting litigation-limiting procedures in
their bylaws because they did not have to get their shareholders' approval.
129. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Fee-Shifting: Delaware'sSelf-Inflicted Wound, 40 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 851, 858 (2016) (noting that "over fifty Delaware corporations adopted feeshifting bylaws by April 2015").
130. See, e.g., Mark Lebovitch & Jeroen van Kwawegen, Of Babies and Bathwater:
DeterringFrivolous Stockholder Suits Without Closing the Courthouse Doors to Legitimate
Claims, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 515-16 (2016) ("[1]t will be difficult for even the largest
institutional investors to take the risk of paying millions, or tens of millions, of dollars in
defense attorneys' fees to correct corporate misconduct when their individual, pro rata share
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high risks and low rewards made it financially perilous for any shareholder
to serve as a lead plaintiff, potentially threatening shareholder litigation as
an enterprise. 3
In June 2015, the Delaware legislature stepped in and barred fee-shifting
provisions. 132 At the same time, however, it expressly permitted forumselection clauses in either the charter or the bylaws.133 The legislative
blessing of forum-selection clauses provided support to Delaware judges
who were looking to crack down on frivolous merger cases. As discussed in
the prior section, 13 4 the challenge for these judges has been maintaining
control over these suits given the wide array of forums in which plaintiffs
can sue. Without forum selection clauses, plaintiffs who wanted to avoid
Delaware's more stringent review of settlements could just file their suit in
another jurisdiction. Now, assuming that a corporation has adopted a
forum-selection clause, Delaware could maintain control over the suits and
reject disclosure-only settlements that do not pass muster under its new
heightened scrutiny.
With the Delaware legislature's approval and the Delaware courts
standing guard, it seemed like the problem of frivolous merger cases would
disappear.135 But the reality has not been so simple because defendants still
have a financial incentive to waive forum selection clauses.136 At first
glance, this may sound surprising. Why wouldn't corporations want to be in
Delaware where the judges are ready to crack down on nuisance
settlements?
The answer lies in the incentives that create these settlements in the first
place. As discussed in Part I, nuisance settlements are so prevalent in the

.

of the potential benefit or recovery created by the litigation will only be a fraction of the
total benefit sought, and when achieving a 'full remedy' is not possible absent lengthy
proceedings.").
131. See id.
132. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(b) (Supp. 2016) ("The bylaws may not contain any
provision that would impose liability on a stockholder for the attorneys' fees or expenses of
the corporation or any other party in connection with an internal corporate claim, as defined
in § 115 of this title.").
133. See id. tit. 8, § 115 ("The certificate of incorporation or the bylaws may require,
consistent with applicable jurisdictional requirements, that any or all internal corporate
claims shall be brought solely and exclusively in any or all of the courts in this State . .
134. See supra Section II.B.1.
135. See Griffith, supra note 115, at 2 (noting that, in the wake of Trulia and legislative
approval of forum-selection bylaws, the problems of merger litigation "appeared to be
solved").
136. See id. at 3 (stating that defendants have a "continued interest in retaining the option
of a cheap settlement and a broad release in an alternative jurisdiction").

2017]

GATEKEEPERS OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

261

merger context because they benefit corporate defendants as well as
plaintiffs' attorneys.137 If a corporation is going to face litigation, it would
often favor a quick, cheap resolution of the suit even more than vindication
after a lengthy and expensive legal battle.138 And even if Delaware
promises to dismiss frivolous suits quickly, corporations might still prefer
to litigate the case outside of Delaware where it will get a cheap settlement
and a global release of all related claims. Corporations are essentially
buying a release when they settle these claims, and this release may be
worth the relatively low cost of litigating and settling a nuisance suit.139 As
a result, even though Delaware stands ready and willing to exercise more
stringent oversight over merger cases, corporations may not want them to
do so.
Faced with this reality, most forum selection clauses allow corporations
to have their cake and eat it, too. A typical clause might provide that the
exclusive forum applies "unless the Corporation consents in writing to the
selection of an alternative forum." 140 Such wording gives corporations a
choice. They can enforce the provision if they want the claims to be
reviewed in Delaware under Delaware's stringent standards. Or they can
waive the provision if they would rather make a few additional disclosures,
pay a few hundred thousand dollars in attorneys' fees, and take their
release. Early evidence reveals that some corporations are indeed waiving
these provisions, although it is still too early to determine the extent of this
trend. 141
This experience shows the drawbacks of relying on corporations as the
gatekeepers in shareholder lawsuits. Although corporations often rail
137. See supra Part I.
138. See Griffith, supra note 115, at 14 ("[O]nce the corporation has become a defendant
in merger litigation, that corporation has a strong incentive to buy the broad, cheap releases
that disclosure settlements provide.").
139. Cf Sean J. Griffith & Alexandra D. Lahav, The Market for Preclusion in Merger
Litigation, 66 VAND. L. REv. 1053, 1084 n.142, 1122 (2013) (discussing the value of
preclusion to defendants).
140. See Cox, supra note 90, at 507-08 ("Though there are many varieties of forumselection bylaws, the most common provision reflects a preference for the forum of the state
of incorporation while also according the board of directors authority to 'waive' the selected
forum in favor of another forum where a suit is pending." (footnote omitted)); Griffith, supra
note 115, at 2-3 ("[D]efense counsel must be seen as complicit in the out-of-Delaware
dynamic because they have failed to exercise Exclusive Forum bylaws to bring the litigation
back to Delaware.").
141. See, e.g., Niedermayer v. Kriegsman, C.A. No. 11800-VCMR (Del. Ch. May 2,
2016) (oral ruling acknowledging novel issues raised by selective enforcement and waiver of
a forum selection bylaw).
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against frivolous claims, the reality is that many corporations like the
opportunity to buy a release. And even those that do not place significant
value in a release may still prefer a cheap settlement over litigating the case,
even in front of a sympathetic judge. In making these decisions,
corporations will act in their own best interests, even if these decisions do
not benefit the legal system as a whole.
Even more concerning, these decisions might reflect other interests
altogether. As noted above, the board alone can typically adopt a forum
selection clause if it is in the corporation's bylaws. 142 And regardless of
whether the clause is in the bylaws or the charter, the board alone decides
whether to waive it. In nearly all shareholder lawsuits, however, the board
members are named as defendants. Any board knows that it is the likely
target of these suits when deciding whether to adopt a forum-selection
provision, and, in most cases, it is the actual target when deciding whether
to waive such a provision. It goes against human nature to presume that
directors will put the corporation's interests ahead of their own. As a result,
we should be wary of trusting directors to serve as faithful monitors of the
corporation's interests, and much less of the legal system more broadly.
Judges should keep these concerns in mind when reviewing other types
of heightened procedures that corporations may include in their charters or
bylaws. Beyond fee shifting or forum selection, there are other types of
procedures that enterprising corporations might want to adopt. Could, for
example, a corporation adopt a minimum ownership requirement, barring
shareholders from suing unless they own more than a threshold percentage
of a corporation's stock? 143 Or could a corporation require all shareholder
suits (or at least shareholder suits filed under state law) to be submitted to
arbitration, effectively stripping courts of their jurisdiction over these
claims?'" Or could corporations use still other types of proceduresheightened pleading, limitations on discovery, or complete bans on non-

142. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
143. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81
BROOK. L. REv. 1637, 1676 (2016) ("Boards can presumably adopt alternative approaches
such as bylaws that require minimum ownership thresholds, limit the scope of available
damages, or eliminate the availability of fees to prevailing plaintiffs.").
144. See Cox & Thomas, supra note 21, at 33 ("The 800-pound gorilla in the room that
has yet to be addressed is whether any states will permit corporate bylaws that mandate
sending shareholder-manager disputes to arbitration."); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured
Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in Corporate Chartersand Bylaws, 104 GEO.
L.J. 583 (2016) (arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act does not require states to uphold
corporate bylaw or charter provisions mandating that shareholder claims be arbitrated).
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monetary settlements-to discourage shareholders from challenging board
actions? 145
The legality of such procedures is still up in the air. The Delaware
legislature has only addressed fee shifting and forum selection. 146 Outside
of these areas, Delaware has taken a hands-off approach, with the Delaware
Supreme Court stating that any such procedures are facially valid and will
be enforceable as long as they are "adopted by the appropriate corporate
procedures and for a proper corporate purpose," suggesting a fairly handsoff approach.1 47 Few other states have weighed in at all.148 As a result,

despite the concerns outlined above, corporate boards have wide latitude to
use procedure to police shareholder claims. As we will see, boards also
have the ability to oversee other types of shareholder lawsuits, albeit in
different ways.
C. Derivative Suits
The legal system has long struggled with the role of the corporate board
in derivative suits. On one hand, derivative suits exist because directors are
frequently named in these suits, and therefore the legal system does not
trust directors to exercise their normal authority over the corporation. Yet,
these claims ultimately belong to the corporation, and directors normally
make decisions on behalf of the corporation. As a result, the law wants to
both give directors power but also closely monitor how they use it. This
section outlines the traditional power of the board over derivative suits, as
well as the role of judges in monitoring how boards exercise this power.
1. CorporateBoards
Corporate boards have long been the primary gatekeepers in shareholder
derivative suits, and for an ostensibly good reason. In a derivative suit, the

145. See generally Erickson, supra note 81, at 85-86.
146. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109(b), 115 (Supp. 2016).
147. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 556 (Del. 2014).
148. Oklahoma recently mandated fee-shifting in all shareholder derivative suits filed in
the state. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1126 (Supp. 2017) ("In any derivative action instituted by a
shareholder of a domestic or foreign corporation, the court having jurisdiction, upon final
judgment, shall require the nonprevailing party or parties to pay the prevailing party or
parties the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, taxable as costs, incurred as a result
of such action."). And a few states have addressed forum-selection bylaws. See, e.g., Galaviz
v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1175 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (rejecting a forum-selection bylaw
where the bylaw was adopted after the alleged misconduct). More broadly, however, there is
little precedent on the limits of litigation-limiting bylaw and charter provisions.
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corporation is the functional plaintiff. 149 Shareholders bring these suits on
behalf of corporations because directors, who normally decide whether
corporations should file lawsuits, are often implicated in the alleged
wrongdoing.1 5 0 The law understandably believes that directors cannot
therefore be trusted to make unbiased decisions regarding the merits of
these suit.s15 The corporation remains the real party in interest, however,
and any recovery obtained in the suit goes into the corporation's coffers. 152
Accordingly, derivative suits are an exception to the normal rule that boards
of directors control corporations. 153 Where possible, however, the law tries
to return power to the board. This effort is reflected in two procedural
mechanisms-the demand requirement and special litigation committees.
The demand requirement mandates that, before filing suit, the plaintiff
make a demand on the corporation's board of directors, requesting that the
board itself file the suit. 154 This requirement is based on the idea that the

board may want to bring the lawsuit itself and, if it does, there is no reason
why this power should be taken away from it.1 55 From this simple

requirement, however, comes a whole host of procedural complications. In
many instances, the board faces a conflict of interest in reviewing the
plaintiff's demand. If the directors face a meaningful risk of personal

149. See NL Indus., Inc. v. MAXXAM, Inc. (In re MAXXAM, Inc./Federated Dev.
S'holders Litig.), 698 A.2d 949, 956 (Del. Ch. 1996).
150. See Van Gelder v. Taylor, 621 F. Supp. 613, 620 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("As a general
rule, the plaintiff stockholder in a stockholder's derivative suit is 'at best the nominal
plaintiff.' The corporation is the real party in interest, regardless of the fact that the corporate
management has failed to pursue the action." (internal citation omitted) (quoting Liddy v.
Urbanek, 707 F.2d 1222, 1224 (11th Cir. 1983)).
151. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984) ("The derivative action
developed in equity to enable shareholders to sue in the corporation's name where those in
control of the company refused to assert a claim belonging to it.").
152. See Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 351 (Del. 1988) ("In [a derivative
suit] the shareholder sues on behalf of the corporation .... [A]ny damages recovered ... are
paid to the corporation." (quoting CLARK, supra note 26, at 639-40)).
153. See In re Activision Blizzard, Inc. S'holder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1044 (Del. Ch.
2015) ("A corporate claim is an asset of the corporation, so authority over the claim
ordinarily rests with the board of directors.").
154. See, e.g., DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1(a) ("The complaint shall also allege with particularity
the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the
directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiffs failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort.").
155. See, e.g., Am. Int'l Group, Inc. v. Greenburg, 965 A.2d 763, 808 (Del. Ch. 2009)
(stating that the demand requirement "exists to preserve the primacy of board
decisionmaking regarding legal claims belonging to the corporation").
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liability, they almost certainly will not authorize the corporation to file suit
against them.
In recognition of this conflict, many states allow shareholders to avoid
the demand requirement if they can allege with particularity that demand
would be futile.156 In these states, if the shareholder makes a demand and
does not allege futility, the shareholder is deemed to have conceded the
board's independence.15 7 If the board then rejects the demand and decides
not to sue, as is likely, that decision is protected by the business judgment
rule and is unlikely to be overturned. Put another way, if the shareholder
makes a demand, the board will likely reject it and the shareholder will not
be able to sue. As a result, shareholders generally try to avoid the demand
15
requirement by alleging that demand would be futile.s
A significant
number of derivative suits therefore begin with a procedural skirmish over
159
demand futility.

If the board loses this skirmish, it has one more opportunity to take
control of the suit. It can form a committee of one or more directors-called
a special litigation committee ("SLC")-to review the suit.160 This review
is different than that of a judge. The main goal of the SLC is not to
determine whether the claims have merit, although the merits will likely be
a significant part of the analysis. Instead, it is trying to determine whether
156. See, e.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 120 (Del.
Ch. 2009) ("Where, as here, a plaintiff does not make a pre-suit demand on the board of
directors, the complaint must plead with particularity facts showing that a demand on the
board would have been futile.").
157.

See DEBORAH A. DEMOTT &

DAVID F. CAVERS,

SHAREHOLDER

DERIVATIVE

ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.10, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2016) (stating that, in
many jurisdictions, "while the directors may ultimately refuse the demand, by making a
demand the plaintiff may forego the opportunity of testing the availability of excuse").
158. See id.
159. See Erickson, supra note 44, at 1780-84 (discussing the fights over demand futility
in derivative suits filed in federal court). Many states have tried to avoid these skirmishes by
eliminating the futility defense. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.07401(2) (West 2016); VA.
CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(B)(1) (West 2016). In these states, the demand requirement is
universal and cannot be avoided. Even here, however, there are fights about the implications
of the board's rejection of the demand. See Daniel J. Morrissey, The Pathof CorporateLaw:
Of Options Backdating, Derivative Suits, and the Business Judgment Rule, 86 OR. L. REV.
973, 999 (2007) ("However, the requirement of universal demand and the Delaware rule
allowing it to be excused may amount to much the same thing. In a universal demand
jurisdiction, if a board refuses to sue after a demand, the plaintiff must show by
particularized pleadings why her derivative suit should go forward. That burden is just like
the one facing a derivative plaintiff in Delaware who claims that demand should be
excused." (footnotes omitted)).
160. See DEMOTT & CAVERS, supra note 157, § 5.14.
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the suit is in the best interests of the corporation.16 1 This analysis can take
into account the cost of the litigation, any bad press that might be associated
with the suit, the impact of the suit on other legal proceedings to which the
corporation is a party, and any other relevant factors.1 62 If the SLC decides
that the suit is in the corporation's best interests, taking all of these factors
into account, it can seek to take control of the litigation. 16 If it reaches the
opposite conclusion, it can ask the court to dismiss the suit.164

Putting the pieces together, the board of directors serves as the primary
gatekeeper in shareholder derivative suits, with judges closely monitoring
their actions. The role of judges will be examined in the next subsection,
but the role of directors is both understandable and somewhat concerning.
On one hand, it makes sense that the law would rely on corporate boards to
pass judgment on derivative claims. These claims belong to the corporation,
and boards are the traditional steward of corporate interest. 16 As long as
directors are able to act independently, the law should defer to them.
On the other hand, it is questionable whether directors can ever act truly
independently when it comes to evaluating claims against fellow directors.
Although SLC members are technically independent-i.e., they are
generally not named as defendants in the suit-they are still directors
evaluating claims made against other directors. As a result, they may have a
"there but for the grace of God go I" feeling when evaluating the claims,
giving other directors the same benefit of the doubt that they themselves

161. See In re INFOUSA, Inc. S'holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 986 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(stating that "[a] board may in good faith refuse a shareholder demand to begin litigation
even if there is substantial basis to conclude that the lawsuit would eventually be successful
on the merits" because the board may consider, in the exercise of its business judgment,
whether it "would be excessively costly to the corporation or harm its long-term strategic
interests").
162. See, e.g., 1 R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, The Delaware Law of
Corporationsand Business Organizations§ 13.15 (3d ed. 1997) (listing factors that special
litigation committee should consider).
163. See Minor Myers, The Decisions of Corporate Special Litigation Committees: An
Empirical Investigation, 84 IND. L.J. 1309, 1313 (2009) ("After its investigation, the SLC
decides whether to pursue the claims, settle them, or seek their dismissal.").
164. See id. ("If the SLC concludes that pressing the claims is not in the best interests of
the corporation, it will generally produce a written report supporting its conclusion and will
move on behalf of the corporation to dismiss the claims.").
165. See e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the direction of a
board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in its certificate of
incorporation.").
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would want if they were ever named in a similar lawsuit.166 Judges evaluate
but there are
SLC recommendations with an increased level of scrutiny,
still concerns that structural bias makes the entire SLC process inherently
suspect. 168
Moreover, the demand requirement and the SLC process mean that
shareholders must run a gauntlet of procedural hurdles before they can
present the substance of their claims. Almost all published opinions in
derivative litigation concern demand futility or SLC recommendations or
other procedural battles.169 It is not unusual for a case to proceed for years
before the court gets to the merits of the claims. The goal of these myriad
gatekeeping devices is to sort the cases with merit from those without. One
wonders whether it would be more efficient to dispense with these costly
procedures and proceed directly to the substance of the claims. This
question becomes especially acute when one considers the judicial
resources that these procedures entail.
2. Judges
Judges play a particularly important role in derivative litigation.
Although the legal system depends largely on directors to evaluate the
derivative claims filed by shareholder plaintiffs, it relies on judges to
review the decisions made by directors. Put another way, directors monitor
shareholder plaintiffs, and judges monitor the directors. Yet, as judges
themselves have pointed out, they are not necessarily well-suited for this
role.
This point is highlighted by the role of judges in reviewing SLC
decisions. As noted above, judges use enhanced scrutiny in reviewing these
decisions because SLC directors, although technically independent, have a

166. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,787 (Del. 1981).
167. See id. ("We are not satisfied, however, that acceptance of the 'business judgment'
rationale at this stage of derivative litigation is a proper balancing point. While we admit an
analogy with a normal case respecting board judgment, it seems to us that there is sufficient
risk in the realities of a situation like the one presented in this case to justify caution beyond
adherence to the theory of business judgment.").
168. See, e.g., Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., StructuralBias, Special Litigation Committees, and
the Vagaries of DirectorIndependence, 90 IOWA L. REv. 1305 (2005).

169. See, e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006); In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2004) (evaluating a claim of demand futility); In
re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003) (reviewing an SLC
decision); In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(reviewing a settlement in a derivative suit).
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structural bias in reviewing claims filed against other directors. 1o As a
result, in Delaware and many other states, the court uses a two-step form of
review. The Delaware Supreme Court developed this test in Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado. ' First, under Zapata, the court examines the independence
and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions.172
Second, it determines, "applying its own independent business judgment,
whether the motion should be granted." 173
The second step of this test has raised eyebrows. Are judges particularly
well-suited to apply "their own independent business judgment"? Do most
judges even have such judgment? Yet, as the Delaware Supreme Court has
made clear, this test was never meant to give judges a tremendous amount
of power. Instead, it simply gives judges the flexibility to override an SLC
decision when something feels "off." As the Delaware Supreme Court has
held, "The second step is intended to thwart instances where corporate
actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not appear to satisfy
its spirit, or where corporate actions would simply prematurely terminate a
stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration in the
corporation's interest." 174 There is no expectation, in other words, that
judges will conduct in-depth reviews of the business merits of SLC
decisions.
Yet, this form of review highlights the curious role of judges in
evaluating derivative claims. Although the law wants directors to be the
first line of defense against frivolous derivative claims, it also does not fully
trust them in this role. As a result, the legal system relies on judges to be the
equivalent of watchdogs, stepping in when a board or SLC's decision does
not pass the smell test.
In this way, judges serve a somewhat different role than that
contemplated by the PSLRA. Under the PSLRA, judges are supposed to
apply the standards set out by Congress. 175 There will always be some
discretion in how exactly judges apply these standards, but their discretion
is still intentionally cabined. Under Zapata, however, judges are supposed
to be broader protectors of the corporate interest. Their role here is similar

170. See supra notes 166-168 and accompanying text.
171. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 789.
174. See id.
175. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A) (2012) ("In any private action arising under this chapter,
the court shall, on the motion of any defendant, dismiss the complaint if the requirements of
paragraphs (1) and (2) are not met." (emphasis added)).
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to their role in reviewing settlements in derivative suits and class actions
where they are tasked with ensuring that the settlement is "in the best
interests" of the class or the plaintiff corporation. 176
This broader role has its own challenges. It is one thing for judges to
apply discrete legal standards. It is another thing altogether for judges to
oversee decisions made by others, whether these decisions are SLC requests
to dismiss a derivative suit or joint requests by the parties to settle the
derivative suit. It takes a significant amount of time to dig into a case and
come up with reasons to reject a suggested course of conduct. Given the
already-significant demands on judges, will most judges find the time
necessary to perform this oversight role effectively? Or will they simply
rubberstamp a SLC's request and get the case off their docket? These
questions, and the paucity of data available to answer them, challenge the
notion that judges are the key to solving the problems in shareholder
lawsuits.
D. Reflecting on Gatekeepers
As we have seen, shareholder lawsuits share the same need for
gatekeepers, yet different types of shareholder lawsuits rely on very
different gatekeepers. Examining this phenomenon leads to two important
observations. First, there are good reasons for the differences. Although
securities class actions, merger cases, and derivative suits all fall under the
umbrella of shareholder litigation, there are important differences between
these suits that have influenced the gatekeepers in each. In securities class
actions, for example, there is often enough money at stake to make it
economically rational for institutional investors to spend more of their time
monitoring the litigation.1 7 7 In merger cases, the problems got so bad that
Delaware judges were forced to step in to protect the shareholder litigation
franchise. 17 And in derivative suits, the claims ultimately belong to the
plaintiff corporation, 179 so it is not surprising that the law carves out a role
for corporate boards to monitor these suits.

176. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(1)(B); DEL. R. Cv. P. 23.1(a)-(b).
177. See Weiss, supra note 55, at 574.
178. See, e.g., Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-JurisdictionalShareholderLitigation, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REv. 467, 469 (arguing that Delaware had become a "pariah in shareholder litigation"
because "[o]ver the past fifteen years, shareholders have spurned the Delaware courts and
are now likely to file fiduciary lawsuits elsewhere").
179. See NL Indus., Inc. v. MAXXAM, Inc. (In re MAXXAM, Inc./Federated Dev.
S'holders Litig.), 698 A.2d 949, 956 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("A derivative claim belongs to the
corporation, not to the shareholder plaintiff who brings the action.").
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Second, there is no single gatekeeper that solves all problems associated
with shareholder lawsuits. Each gatekeeper solves some of the problems,
but creates others. In securities class actions, institutional investors do
indeed bargain with plaintiffs' attorneys for lower fees, but they are also
subject to their own conflicts of interest with law firms trying to curry
favor.18 0 In merger cases, Delaware judges can crack down on settlements
that come before them, but they will have difficulty stopping cases from
fleeing to other jurisdictions.1"' And in derivative suits, corporate boards
can review derivative claims to determine whether they are in the
corporation's interests, but it will be hard to avoid the directors' own
interests seeping into this review. 1 2
As a result, the goal of this comparative effort should not be to
standardize the gatekeepers across different types of shareholder litigation.
Nor should we call it a day and be satisfied with the status quo. Instead, we
should try to take the lessons from these different contexts and see if they
can have broader applicability.
III. Toward a BroaderApproach to LitigationGatekeeping
A. Judges as Enhanced Gatekeepers
Judges are the first line of defense in shareholder lawsuits. In all class
actions and derivative suits, judges approve all settlements, decide all
motions, and preside over all trials.183 In many ways, therefore, judges are
already valuable gatekeepers in these suits. The experience of merger class
actions, however, demonstrates that judges can be even more influential,
dramatically changing the settlement practices in each type of litigation.
One wonders, therefore, whether judges could similarly act as enhanced
gatekeepers in derivative suits and securities class actions. Rather than
rubber-stamping settlements in derivative suits, judge could scrutinize these
settlements, especially those that involve corporate governance reforms
rather than monetary consideration. Piggybacking on the Delaware Court of
Chancery's new standard in reviewing merger settlements, they could then
reject those derivative settlements that do not offer "plainly material"

180. See supra Section II.A.
181. See supra Section II.B.
182. See supra Section II.C.
183. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e), 23.1(c) (requiring judges to approve settlements in
class actions in derivative suits). In Delaware, judges preside over all trials in the Chancery
Court. In other jurisdictions, the claims may be decided by a jury, but the judge will still
preside over the trial.
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benefits for the plaintiff corporation and/or its shareholders. 18 4 Similarly,
judges could adopt a rebuttable presumption against non-monetary
settlements, forcing litigants to explain precisely how the settlement is
beneficial. 115
In securities class actions, the concerns are different, relating to conflicts
of interest involving institutional plaintiffs, not non-monetary settlements.
Nonetheless, judges could bring comparable oversight to these conflicts of
interests, asking tough questions about the financial relationships between
institutional investors and their attorneys. For example, in reviewing lead
counsel petitions, judges could require applicants to complete standardized
disclosure forms that include, among other things, information regarding
any campaign contributions or other types of payments made by the
applicants' law firms to the plaintiff or any individual who controls the
plaintiff.1 6 Alternatively, judges could ask about these relationships during
hearings, making clear that any plausible conflicts of interests will bar a
shareholder from serving as lead plaintiff. To the extent that sunshine is the
best disinfectant, this oversight could reduce unethical practices.
This is not to say that judicial oversight is an easy panacea in either type
of litigation. It is hard for individual judges to make systematic changes in
the way these suits are litigated. Individual judges can reject poor-quality
settlements presented to them, but it would take collective action from a
significant number of judges to make a real difference in these suits. This
collective action would be difficult to pull off. Judges work largely
independently, and they handle civil and criminal cases in a variety of
areas. It is difficult for them to know the enforcement problems in any
particular area of the law, much less the specific steps taken by individual
judges to try to combat these problems.
This collective action is especially challenging given that derivative suits
and securities class actions are spread throughout the country. Delaware
judges were able to crack down on abusive practices in merger litigation
because a majority of merger cases were filed in Delaware.18 7 Although

184. See In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 898-99 (Del. Ch. 2016).
185. Cf Griffith, supra note 25, at 47 ("[I]n cases where corporate benefit is recognized,
courts should conduct a more rigorous inquiry into how the benefit was created.").
186. I suggested a similar form of standard disclosures in an earlier article. See Jessica
M. Erickson, The New Professional Plaintifs in Shareholder Litigation, 65 FLA. L. REv.
1089, 1134-37 (2013).
187. SINHA, supra note 42, at 3 (noting that in the first three quarters of 2015, plaintiffs
filed seventy-four percent of cases challenging mergers in Delaware, although that
percentage dropped sharply since the decision in Trulia).
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Delaware had to struggle (and still struggles) to keep these cases,' they
always maintained enough influence that lawyers had to pay close attention
to their opinions. In contrast, securities class actions are filed in federal
district courts across the country, and derivative suits can often be filed in
state or federal court. These cases are overrepresented in certain
geographical areas, but no state or court has the same influence that
Delaware has over merger cases.
These challenges, however, should not deter judges from trying to serve
as more active gatekeepers. First, individual judges can be influential.
Judge Jed Rakoff's rejection of the corporate settlements with the Securities
& Exchange Commission, for example, influenced the SEC's practices
more broadly, revealing the power that one judge armed with good
questions can have.18 9 Moreover, judges in certain districts or courts can
work together, announcing greater scrutiny in the cases that collectively
come before them. Nearly sixty percent of securities class actions are filed
in the Ninth and Second Circuits.1 90 Any rule announced in these circuits
would undoubtedly have reverberations throughout the country.
Derivative suits are also concentrated in these two circuits,1 91 although
they are likely more dispersed than securities class actions given that they
can be filed in state or federal court. 192 Nonetheless, a few judges publicly
critiquing practices in these suits and announcing new gatekeeping
practices would likely get widespread attention. It would also give
ammunition to shareholder objectors who could spread the message to other
courts.
Greater judicial oversight is unlikely to completely solve the problems in
securities class actions or derivative suits. It would, however, bolster efforts
by other gatekeepers to crack down on the problems in these lawsuits. As
we will see, corporate boards and shareholders could also play a more
significant role.
188. See id. See generally Griffith, supra note 115 (describing Delaware's often
unsuccessful struggle to retain control over merger cases).
189. See Matthew G. Neumann, Note, Neither Admit Nor Deny: Recent Changes to the
Securities & Exchange Commission's Longstanding Settlement Policy, 40 J. CORP. L. 793,
794 (2015) (noting that Judge Rakoff's pushback on SEC settlement practices prompted the
SEC to change its practices).
190.

CORNERSTONE

RESEARCH,

SECURITIES CLASS

ACTION FILINGS:

2015

YEAR IN

27 (2016), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/Securities-ClassAction-Filings-2015-Year-in-Review.
191. See Erickson, supra note 44, at 1764 (finding that more than half of federal
derivative suits are filed in the Second or Ninth Circuits).
192. See id. (examining research on derivative suits filed in both state and federal courts).
REVIEW
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B. CorporateBoards and Shareholders as Enhanced Gatekeepers
A second possibility for enhanced gatekeeping is through self-help.
Corporate boards and shareholders may be able to make greater use of
bylaw and charter amendments to protect themselves against frivolous
shareholder lawsuits. As detailed above in Part II, corporate boards and
shareholders have already started to use these amendments to limit merger
litigation.193 A significant number of companies have adopted bylaw or
charter amendments specifying that any intra-corporate dispute, including
fiduciary duty claims, must be filed in Delaware. 194 Several companies
similarly adopted fee-shifting bylaws and charter amendments before they
were barred by the Delaware General Assembly. 195 A few companies are
also experimenting with other types of bylaw and charter amendments. 196
Collectively, these amendments have succeeded in bringing a significant
percentage of merger cases back to Delaware and perhaps also in
discouraging the filing of meritless challenges to mergers.
The question now is whether these amendments can have a similar
impact in other types of shareholder litigation. Many of these provisions
already cover shareholder derivative suits because they are worded broadly
to include all fiduciary duty litigation. 197 And some are written even more

193. See supra Section JJ.B.2.
194. See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
196. Soon after the Delaware Supreme Court upheld fee-shifting bylaws in ATP Tours,
four related companies announced bylaws prohibiting its stockholders from initiating a
direct or derivative claim unless the claiming stockholder delivers to the corporate secretary
written consent by beneficial stockholders owning at least three percent of the outstanding
shares. See, e.g., Imperial Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) Exhibit 3.2 (Nov. 3,
2014).
197.

See, e.g., CLAUDIA H. ALLEN, STUDY OF DELAWARE FORUM SELECTION IN CHARTERS

AND BYLAWs (Jan. 15, 2012), https://www.kattenlaw.com/Files/45103_Jan_%202012
Forum Study.pdf (noting that the model forum selection bylaw typically covers (i) "any
derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of the corporation", (ii) "any action asserting
a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any director or officer to the corporation or its
stockholders", (iii) "any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the
Delaware General Corporation Law", or (iv) "any action asserting a claim governed by the
internal affairs doctrine"); Shareholder Suit Challenging Groundbreaking Minimum-Supportto-Sue Bylaw Dismissed, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.foley.
com/shareholder-suit-challenging-groundbreaking-minimum-support-to-sue-bylaw-dismissed10-19-2015/ (providing language of minimum ownership bylaw that covers any claim "on
behalf of (1) the corporation and/or (2) any class of current and/or prior shareholders against
the corporation and/or against any director and/or officer of the corporation in his or her official
capacity").
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broadly, sweeping in all claims filed by shareholders against the
corporation, including securities class actions.198 As a result, efforts by
corporations and shareholders to limit frivolous merger claims may have
spillover efforts on derivative suits and securities class actions. And the fact
that corporations have started to use bylaw and charter amendments in the
merger context may prompt them to consider using these amendments in
other types of shareholder lawsuits.
Nonetheless, there are particular challenges in relying on bylaw and
charter amendments in securities class actions and derivative suits. First, it
is unlikely that this form of self-help will become as common outside of the
merger context. Merger cases are especially well-suited for such self-help.
When a company is contemplating a merger or acquisition, it knows that it
will likely be sued.1 99 It also must often amend its charter and/or bylaws as
part of the transaction.200 As a result, the company knows that it is a target,
and it is relatively easy for the company to protect itself.
In contrast, derivative suits and securities class actions are usually filed
in the immediate aftermath of revelations of bad news. 201 This bad news
typically is not easy to predict, making it difficult for the corporation to
amend its governing documents beforehand. Amending protective
provisions as soon as the bad news is announced would likely draw even
more negative attention to the company. In addition, these revelations will
likely occur at times when the company is not otherwise planning to amend
its bylaws or charter, so doing so would take special effort.
Second, the types of provisions used in the merger context may not be
the best fit for derivative suits or securities class actions. In the merger
198. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The Intersectionof Fee-Shifting Bylaws and Securities
Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 379, 388-89 (2015) (discussing a fee-shifting bylaw that
covered both state and federal claims); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Delaware Throws a
Curveball, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Mar. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/BE9G-S8CE (noting that
Delaware's prohibition against fee-shifting bylaw and charter provisions does not cover
securities class actions).
199. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of merger
litigation).
200. See, e.g., Robert B. Little, "Exclusive Forum" Bylaws Fast Becoming an Item in
M&A Deals, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FiN. REG. (May 13, 2015), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/05/13/exclusive-forum-bylaws-fast-becoming-an-item-in-madeals/ ("Public company M&A targets that do not already have such bylaws in place should
consider adopting them concurrently with the announcement of a deal.").
201. See Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical
Examination, 97 IOWA L. REV. 49, 58 (2011) (nothing that shareholder derivative suits are
frequently filed in the wake of a "discrete event such as an accounting error or an alleged
misstatement to the market").
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context, the chief goal of these provisions was to bring the cases back to
Delaware where Delaware judges could scrutinize the claims and the
settlements.2 02 In derivative suits, there is not a single forum that offers
such benefits. Delaware could start to monitor these suits more closely, but
so far it has not shown much inclination to do so. 203 And there is good
reason for most derivative suits to be filed outside of Delaware. These suits
often arise out of the same series of events as a parallel securities class
action, and therefore there are efficiencies in allowing the two suits to
proceed in the same jurisdiction before the same judge. 204 The federal
courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all securities class actions,205 and
therefore, forcing derivative suits into Delaware court would eliminate
these efficiencies. Nor is there a specific federal court where judges are
more likely to provide greater oversight of these claims. As a result, a
forum-selection bylaw may not be the best way to improve derivative suits
or securities class actions.
There may be other types of provisions, however, that would allow
corporations and their shareholders to crack down on frivolous derivative or
securities claims. The legal system is still largely in unchartered waters
206
when it comes to bylaw or charter provisions designed to limit litigation.
For example, can corporations adopt minimum ownership requirements,
limiting which shareholders are allowed to file derivative suits or class
actions? Can they change the pleading standards or put new limitations on
discovery? Can they police non-monetary settlements? In Delaware, at
least, the answer appears to be yes, assuming that they are adopted for a
proper corporate purpose.207 This judicial deference gives corporations
ample room to engage in self-help through litigation-limiting bylaw or
charter amendments.
Yet, there are dangers in relying on corporations to be the primary
gatekeeper in shareholder lawsuits. For the most part, corporate boards can
202. See supra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
203. There has been no equivalent of Trulia in the derivative suit context. There are a few
instances of Delaware judges rejecting proposed settlements in derivative suits, but these
cases are the exception. See, e.g., Smollar v. Potarazu, C.A. No. 10287-VCN (Del. Ch. Jan.
14, 2016) (rejecting a settlement in a derivative suit where the plaintiff had negotiated a
separate benefit not shared by the corporation or the other shareholders).
204. Erickson, supra note 201, at 80 (arguing that "many shareholder derivative suits
may simply serve as tagalong suits to other types of corporate litigation," especially
securities class actions).
205. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78kk (2012).
206. See supranotes 146-147 and accompanying text.
207. ATP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 555 (Del. 2014).
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adopt bylaw provisions on their own, without shareholder approval.208
Directors know that they are the likely defendants in any future shareholder
lawsuit. It is inevitable, therefore, that their own self-interest will influence
their decision making, especially as they consider proposed amendments
that will make it more difficult for them to be sued.
This fact should prompt caution among those optimistic about the
promise of self-help options. For obvious reasons, directors are not
unbiased decision makers when it comes to deciding if the corporation
should be able to sue them. The legal system has already recognized this
exact point in derivative suits. The law allows corporate boards to review
shareholder demands and then form an SLC to review the lawsuit as a
whole, but it also subjects these decisions that emerge from such reviews to
enhanced scrutiny.20 9 SLC decisions are not entitled to the business
judgment rule precisely because of concerns about possible unconscious
biases.210 These same biases should cause judges to proceed cautiously
when reviewing litigation-limiting bylaws.
This does not mean that corporations should never be able to engage in
self-help when it comes to shareholder litigation. First, if shareholders
approve the provision either through a charter amendment or through a
211
shareholder-approved bylaw amendment, there is less cause for concern.
Shareholders may not be perfect judges of the right procedure in
shareholder lawsuits, but they do not suffer from the same biases as
directors. Instead, their interests are perfectly aligned with the
corporation-they only want the corporation to sue when the suit would be
financially advantageous.
Second, if the board alone adopts the provisions through a bylaw
amendment, courts should use greater scrutiny. This scrutiny can build on
the enhanced review already used in derivative suits.212 This review should

not be fatal to all litigation-limiting bylaws, but courts should closely
examine whether the procedures are likely to be effective in sorting
meritorious claims from meritless ones. Procedures designed to curtail
shareholder suits across the board, without regard to the merit of the claims,
should be rejected. In short, the legal system should allow corporate boards
208. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2011) (providing that corporations can allow
shareholders or the board to amend the bylaws).
209. See supra notes 154-169 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 162-169 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (discussing how charter amendments
must be approved by both shareholders and the board).
212. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779,787 (Del. 1981).

2017]

GATEKEEPERS OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION

277

to be active gatekeepers in shareholder lawsuits, but only under the careful
supervision of the courts.
C Legislatures as Enhanced Gatekeepers
Legislatures have traditionally played only a small gatekeeping role in
shareholder litigation. Aside from the PSLRA, Congress has rarely
interjected itself into the fray of these suits. State legislatures have played a
slightly greater role, but even they have not been active gatekeepers. 213
These lawmakers could build on the lessons of the PSLRA and explore new
legislation to police shareholder lawsuits, including legislation that would
improve the gatekeeping abilities of other players in these suits.
At the federal level, for example, Congress could amend the PSLRA to
require greater disclosures by shareholders applying to serve as lead
plaintiffs. Under the PSLRA as it is currently written, shareholders only
need to disclose their financial stake in the litigation as well as their past
participation in other shareholder lawsuits.214 Congress could ensure that
courts are in a better position to evaluate shareholder applicants by
requiring shareholders to disclose any financial relationship with their
counsel, including campaign contributions. It could also require
shareholders to disclose fee arrangements they have made with their
counsel, giving judges a way to know if shareholders are taking advantage
of their bargaining power to protect class interests.
Similarly, at either the state or federal level, legislatures could serve as
gatekeepers over litigation-limiting bylaw and charter provisions. Corporate
boards and shareholders have an interest in using governance documents to
limit frivolous litigation, but neither are perfectly positioned to be the sole
arbiters of these suits. Boards have inherent conflicts of interest, while
shareholders may not be sufficiently informed to know the costs and
benefits of different procedural tools.
Legislatures, and the rulemaking committees that support them, can
assist in this role.215 Rather than allowing corporations to adopt any
provisions they want, legislatures could come up with a menu of
acceptable, procedural provisions that corporations can include in their

213. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
214. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2) (2012).
215. See 1 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 440 (rev.
Sept. 2011), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/laws-andprocedures-governing-work-rules-committees-0
(describing
work
of the Judicial
Conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and its Advisory Rules
Committees).
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bylaws or charters. The ultimate decision of whether to adopt these
provisions would remain with the corporation, but the legislature would
ensure that the provisions available effectively sort the good cases from the
bad.
This approach may reduce some of the bias in procedural rulemaking.
Lawmakers do not have the same conflicts of interest as corporate directors
in reviewing new procedures. And they can draw on the expertise of judges,
lawyers, and academics who know more about the pros and cons of various
procedures than do corporate directors. This is especially true if lawmakers
work through the traditional rulemaking process, which seeks input from a
216
variety of constituencies before implementing new rules2.
This approach
to procedure is far less likely to lead to biased procedures than corporate
directors drafting the procedures that will later govern suits filed against
them.
At the same time, it is important not to overstate the promise of
legislative gatekeeping. First, lawmakers suffer from their own biases, as
the PSLRA demonstrated.217 Although the public may wish that lawmakers
crafted impartial solutions to thorny problems, the reality is messier.
Lawmakers often act with less nuance, and more partisan jockeying, than
procedural experts might desire. In the end, politics comes into procedural
drafting, just as it comes into everything else that legislatures do.
Second, legislatures may not be anxious to wade into the procedural fray.
In Delaware, for example, the General Assembly largely leaves corporate
law to the Delaware bar, relying on a committee of lawyers to propose and
review amendments to Delaware's General Corporation Law. 218 This
committee took more than a year to ban fee-shifting bylaws and charter
provisions, despite the strong argument that these provisions could be fatal

216. See How the Rule Making Process Works, U.S. COURTs http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works
(last visited May
27, 2017) (describing the process for amending federal procedural rules).
217. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIz. L.
REv. 717, 732 (1996) (describing Congress's selective use of anecdotes in compiling a
record to support the PSLRA); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Actions and Limited Vision,
Opportunitiesfor Improvement Through a More FunctionalApproach to Class Treatment of
Disputes, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1127, 1140 (2005) (describing Congress's view toward
securities class actions when it passed the PSLRA as "more hostile than welcoming").
218. See Guhan Subramanian, Delaware's Choice, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 48 (2014) ("As
is well-known to insiders but surprising to everyone else, the Council of Corporation Law, a
group of 27 well-respected attorneys mostly from prominent Wilmington firms, proposes all
amendments to the DGCL. The Council writes the corporate law of Delaware and, by
extension, the country." (footnote omitted)).
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to shareholder litigation more broadly.219 It seems unlikely that the
Delaware legislature would take on a wholesale review of litigationlimiting procedures. In other states, litigation-limiting bylaws or charter
amendments are not on current agendas, and there is no indication that
other states want to be leaders in this area. As a result, while legislatures
could play a more significant gatekeeping role, it is questionable whether
they in fact have the inclination to do so.
In the end, there is no perfect gatekeeper when it comes to shareholder
litigation. This point, however, bolsters the argument in favor of multiple
gatekeepers. Rather than relying on judges or shareholders or legislatures to
single-handedly monitor shareholder lawsuits, the legal system should think
more broadly. Different gatekeepers can work together to ensure that these
lawsuits reflect the best interests of shareholders.
Conclusion
Corporate law is all about agency costs. Within the world of shareholder
litigation, the question is how to make plaintiffs' attorneys act in the best
interests of shareholders-a problem that is common to all types of
shareholder lawsuits. Yet, as this Article demonstrates, different types of
shareholder lawsuits rely on very different gatekeepers to control agency
costs. Securities class actions rely on institutional plaintiffs and Congress.
Merger cases rely on judges and litigation-limiting provisions in corporate
bylaws and charters. And derivative suits rely largely on corporate boards.
On their own, however, none of these gatekeepers have been able to solve
the problems inherent in shareholder litigation.
This Article advocates a broader approach to litigation gatekeeping.
Rather than relying on a narrow gatekeeping model, the legal system should
explore the possibility of using a broader range of gatekeepers to control
agency costs. Judges should use closer scrutiny in reviewing proposed
settlements in all types of shareholder lawsuits. Corporate boards and
shareholders should make greater use of their bylaws and charters. And
legislatures should explore the use of heightened procedure to cut down on
frivolous lawsuits. No single gatekeeper is the answer, but together, they
may be able to solve the oldest problem in corporate law.

219. See Francis Pileggi, Delaware Proposes New Fee-Shifting and Forum Selection
Legislation, DEL. CORP. & COM. LITIG. BLOG (Mar. 6, 2015), https://perma.cc/TP2C-8YJ3
(describing the process leading up to the legislation).

